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Abstract: The topic of this article is a 
reinterpretation of the establishment of the Mongolian 
Empire from an information history point of view. At the 
beginning of the 13th century Genghis Khan united the 
nomadic Mongolian tribes and established the largest 
inland empire, never before seen in history. The borders 
of the new state reached from China in the East and the 
Carpathians in the West. Research over the past 200 
years based the success of this vast empire on many 
reasons including the nomadic military organization as 
well as the favorable political situation of that time. In 
the following I will demonstrate the fact that the role of 
information and disinformation in this subject was 
utmost importance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The notions of information and disinformation are very 
important in our daily life today. In the 21th century the 
flow of information is faster than it has been any time 
before. At the same time governments, companies, 
political parties make enormous efforts to preserve 
information from their opponents at all costs. In this 
competition of getting and saving information 
disinformation is also a major factor. This phenomenon 
wasn’t  different  throughout  history.  From  the  beginning  
of time people tried to get as much information as they 
could about their surroundings, while disclosing as little 
as possible about themselves. Military activities apply 
the same tactics. Historians have proved the existence of 
intelligence services during the time of the states of the 
Ancient Near East (Dvornik, 1974). A discipline of 
information history researches the role of the flow of 
information during wars throughout the history of 
mankind. This article aims to examine this flow of 
information and disinformation during the period of the 
Mongolian conquest in the 13th century. In addition I 
will examine the bureaucratic institutions of the 
Mongolian Empire. The role of information and 
disinformation appears in many different situations 
during the analysis of the Mongolian conquest. I have 
divided the presence of these phenomena into four 
categories: diplomatic relations, military intelligence, 
postal system, circulation of military technologies. 
II. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
We can handle the presence of information and 
disinformation in diplomatic relations and military 
activities in history as a part of intelligence history. The 
German   historian   Hansgerd   Göckenjan   (2001)  
published an article dealing with nomadic intelligence, 
answering some important questions and contributing 
greatly to this topic. Nevertheless the nomadic 
intelligence has remained poorly researched. This study 
brought attention to the importance of strategic 
intelligence in nomad warfare. Here I have to state that 
from this point on I will use the strategic and tactical 
categories as used in B. H. Liddell  Hart’s  indispensible  
book Strategy (19912). On one hand he claims that 
strategy is the segment in the art of war that minds war 
in general and the different operational theories and 
practices. On the other hand tactics is the segment in the 
art of war that deals with the leading of troops in 
different battle situations. 
Before engaging in larger campaigns, the nomads 
always tried to gather as much information on the 
internal situations of opposing forces as it was possible. 
Accumulating this information was done by using 
different methods, which can be observed in the events I 
researched. Firstly I would like to detail the above 
mentioned diplomatic connections used in nomadic 
intelligence. 
The account given by Friar Julian on his second 
journey to the east from the Hungarian Kingdom in 
1237-38, quotes a letter sent by one of the Mongolian 
leaders  to  the  Hungarian  King,  Béla  IV.  The  messenger  
had been captured by the Suzdal prince before the letter 
reached the recipient. According to the letter, this envoy 
was the 30th sent to the Hungarian King, but the Khan 
had   received  no   reply   so   far   (Dörrie,  1956).  We  might  
consider that number of 30 legations is an exaggeration. 
But a letter from the French traveler Yvo de Narbonne 
proves the presence of Mongolian envoys in the 
Hungarian court. The letter states that the Dalmatian 
governor captured 8 Mongolians, one of which turned 
out to be of English origin. This person acted as an 
interpreter and envoy on behalf of the Mongolian Khan, 
who travelled twice to the court   of   King   Béla   IV  
(Gombos, 1937). On the basis of this information sole, 
we can state that the envoys of the Mongolian Empire 
were well prepared and spoke many different languages. 
The   account   of   Friar   Julian’s   first   journey   (1235-36) 
supports this fact as well, which tells us about his 
meeting with a Mongolian envoy in the course of  the 
Eastern Hungarians. According to the description, the 
envoy spoke Russian, Cuman, German, Persian and 
Mongolian (Gombos, 1938). The movement of these 
envoys in the Mongolian Empire was brought to 
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perfection in a way which had never been seen before in 
nomadic states. Using a method practiced by Persians 
and Arabs, postal stations (called jam) were built 
throughout the Empire. Below I will give further 
information on this subject. The Mongolians not only 
sent but also received many envoys. In the account of 
Polonus  regarding  his  travel  in  the  court  of  Güjük  Khan,  
he writes of 3000 envoys from different countries being 
present at the election ceremony of the Khan (Dawson, 
1955). Meanwhile we can notice that in the accounts of 
monks travelling to the East, only a few pieces of 
information could be gathered regarding the Mongolian 
military organization. The main reason for this was that 
after entering the Empire, the monks were guarded by 
Mongolian escorts. This implies that although many 
envoys travelled throughout the Empire, they were 
successfully hindered from acquiring accurate 
information regarding Mongolian military. I believe this 
to be an early version of counter intelligence and 
disinformation. 
III. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
The military intelligence can be also divided in to 
two parts: strategic and tactical intelligence. We can 
find perfect examples for both in the military history of 
the Mongols. Strategic military intelligence has two 
major parts as well: one is the above discussed 
diplomacy, the other are the preliminary campaigns. 
The goal of these campaigns was not to occupy a 
territory. During these expeditions the Mongols aimed 
to gather as many information about an unknown region 
as they could. In connection with the preliminary or 
investigative campaigns, we may say that the first 
Mongolian expedition to the West which started in the 
autumn of 1219 and ended in 1224 where the ending 
point was the Russian steppe, is regarded by scholars as 
a campaign to acquire knowledge of the area in 
preparation of a large scale attack. A large part of the 
territory was not occupied by military troops, although 
the whole area was investigated by them. We may 
regard this action as a success, since the scattered scout 
groups travelled the Western territories of the steppe, 
gathering first hand information on Middle and Eastern 
Europe. 
The other important part of military intelligence is 
the tactical intelligence. The main goal of these military 
activities   was   to   serve   the   campaign’s   success   with  
information. Fortunately in our sources many 
precedents of this activity can be found. During the 
actual large scale attack a method used in acquiring 
tactical information, was incorporating leaders with a 
wide knowledge of the terrain. In the case of the 
Mongolian conquests in Europe, among the works of 
Jan   Długosz,   there   is   a   source   which   suspects   Rus  
captives in Poland, leading the Mongolian troops. 
The troops functioning as scout groups were called 
manglai, which means forehead (Rachewiltz, 2004). 
Even Friar Giovanni DiPlano Carpini mentions that the 
scout  groups  march  ahead  of  the  army.  He  says:  “When  
they are going to make war, they send ahead an advance 
guard and these carry nothing with them but their tents, 
horses and arms. They seize no plunder, burn no houses 
and slaughter no animals; they only wound and kill men 
or, if they can do nothing else, put them to flight. They 
much prefer, however, to kill than to put to flight. The 
army follows after them, taking everything they come 
across, and they take prisoner or kill any inhabitants 
who are to be found. Not content with this, the chiefs of 
the army next send plunderers in all directions to find 
men and animals, and they are most ingenious at 
searching  them  out.”  (Dawson,  1955) 
We can find more precise information in the reports 
on Mongolians, which can be connected to the Southern 
Chinese Song dynasty. This source writes that the 
primary assignment of the scout troops was to settle on 
the hills and higher terrain that fell in the path of their 
armies, as well as to capture enemy prisoners. The 
source also lists the questions with which the troops 
interrogated their prisoners (Meng-Ta–Hei-Ta, 1980). 
In the book entitled The Secret History of the 
Mongols – wich is the oldest surviving Mongolian 
literary work -, we can find several references that the 
scout groups set up camps at certain distances and sent 
even  more   troops   forward   from   these   points:   “Činggis  
Qa’an  sent  Altan,  Qučar,  and  Dāritai,  as  a  vanguard;;  the  
Ong   Qan   sent   Senggüm,   Jaqa   Gambu,   and   Bilge  
Beki.Patrols were also dispatched ahead of these 
vanguards:  at  Enegen  Güiletü  they  set  up  an  observation  
post;;  beyond  that,  at  Mount  Čekčer,  they  set up another 
observation   post;;   and   beyond   that,   at   Mount   Čiqurqu,  
they   set   up   a   further   observation   post.   Altan,   Qučar,  
Senggüm   and   the   others   of   our   vanguard   arrived   at  
Utkiya. While they were deciding whether to camp 
there, a man from the observation post wich had been 
set  up  at  Čiqurqu  came  riding   in  haste  and  brought   the  
news   that   the   enemy   was   approaching.”   (Rachewiltz,  
2004) 
Based on this data we can say that the Mongol 
troops were able to do long-range, efficient exploration 
on  the  enemy’s  territory. The description of these camps 
can also be found in the reports already mentioned. On 
the basis of this we know that the horses were both 
tended to and fed inside of these camps while in normal 
camps they were kept outside. With this method the 
Mongol scouts could prove their quick response ability. 
Another interesting piece of information is that the 
cooking was done before sunset, and the fires were left 
burning at night while they moved to a different 
location to mislead and misinform the enemy. 
Overall it can be said that the well organized 
military intelligence (strategic as well as tactical) was a 
very important part of the Mongol warfare.  
IV. POSTAL SYSTEM 
The Mongol postal relay system is very well known 
from  Marco   Polo’s   report.   The  Mongol   postal system 
was  established  during  the  reign  of  Ögödei  (1229-1241), 
the third son of Genghis Khan. This network of post 
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stations (jam) was known much earlier in Inner Asia 
and was used before the Mongols had even established 
their empire. The vast size of this network was far more 
extraordinary than any postal system used before 
(Allsen, 2009). In the 13th century the extent of this 
network covered almost the whole empire starting from 
Central Mongolia to China in the East and reached the 
lower Volga in the West. The aim of this huge and 
sophisticated system was to help the flow of information 
and goods throughout the empire. There were three 
types   of   postal   stations:   morin   or   ‘horse’   stations   for  
moving people, messengers, and officials; narin or 
‘careful   [-handling]’   stations   to   enable   the   direct  
communication with the great khan; and tergen or 
‘wagon’   stations   used   for   the   transportation   of   goods.  
The jam was maintained by the Mongol military 
establishment, although the provision of horses and 
supplies was the responsibility of the local population. 
The supplies were given by the locals as a tax to 
maintain these stations. At every relay station horses 
and other neccesary supplies could be found. 
Messengers could change their horses at these stations, 
and by so doing did not have to stop to rest. Important 
messages could be carried at an accelerated rate. Marco 
Polo who travelled around China during the Mongol 
rule   says:   „Thus   it   is   so   expeditiously   conveyed   from  
station to station, that in the course of two days and two 
nights his Majesty receives distant intelligence that in 
the ordinary mode could not be obtained in less than ten 
days.”  (Polo,  1958) 
Even though it may sound like an exaggeration, we 
can say at that time this was the fastest way of 
transmitting information. To be able to use the services 
of these postal relay stations the travelers had to have a 
paiza, which was a Mongol office emblem that served 
as a passport throughout the empire. 
In general we can say the Mongols built up a postal 
relay system that had been known before, but they 
developed immensely. This network was the largest, 
most   sophisticated   and   fastest   at   that   time.   It   can’t   be  
overemphasized that this system and the speed of the 
information relayed by it, was a huge advantage for the 
empire against their enemies. As I stated before, the 
foreign envoys and their Mongol escorts used this 
system as well. In this way this system also prevented 
the intelligence activities of other states against the 
Mongolian Empire. The accurate and fast information 
flow   was   one   of   the   Mongol’s   biggest   advantages  
against their enemies. 
V. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 
At the beginning of the 13th century the Mongolian 
army was equipped with almost the same types of 
weapons as their nomadic predecessors since the first 
centuries A.D. As they conquered lands beyond the 
steppe zone they met with new military technologies. 
The main difference between them and their 
predecessors was that they started to use these 
developments and incorporate them into their warfare. 
The research of this subject today is well processed, 
especially in the works of Thomas T. Allsen. In the 
following I want to summarize his results. 
The Mongols interacted with many sedentary people 
from the Chinese to the people of the Muslim states of 
Middle- and Western-Asia till the Eastern-European 
countries. The armies of these states had their own style 
and equipments of warfare. One of the secrets of the 
Mongol successes was that they could incorporate these 
equipments and apply them to their own style of 
warfare. The biggest innovation of the Mongols was 
that they did not just incorporate the military 
techniques, but they captured the enemy technicians. 
The Mongols regularly moved craftsmen from the 
occupied lands to the center of their empire (Allsen, 
2009). After so doing, these professionals commenced 
working for the good of the Mongolian Empire. During 
the campaigns against North China the Mongols sent 
commissioners (shizhe) into the cities to bring out 
scholars, artisans and technicians before raiding them. 
We know from the Chinese sources that the population 
registers of the Mongols contained separate categories 
for military, merchant, agricultural and artisan 
households. With this practice within only a few 
decades the Mongol rulers created a huge data base that 
contained a great deal of information about the useful 
talents in the empire (Allsen, 2009). Allsen state that 
there existed different types of data bases like maps of 
strategical points and postal relay systems (Allsen, 
2001). 
Over all we can say that the Mongols had a 
systematic practice to incorporate military technology 
and technicians. With this method they could improve 
the effectiveness of their army. Moreover we have to 
say that this practice was not only for military 
technologies and professionals. Recent researches on 
this subject clearly proved the fact, Mongols 
incorporated technologies and experts from many 
disciplines: for example their taxation system, the state 
bureaucratic practices, religions, etc. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this article I introduced a new aspect of analysis of 
the establishment of the Mongolian Empire. The 
exploration of this subject with the aspect of 
information history presented the fact that the fast flow 
of information and the well used disinformation were 
very important factors in the successful conquers of the 
Mongols. The well trained diplomats could gather much 
information from other countries while foreign envoys 
were prevented from it. The military intelligence was 
also well organized, and worked effectively in both 
tactical and strategic dimensions. The subjects of the 
postal relay system and the military technologies show 
us a special talent of the Mongols. They not only 
incorporated and used new technologies and systems, 
but they also developed and applied them to their 
attributes. As we can see the threads of information met 
at the center of the empire. The well organized 
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information relay system and the data bases helped the 
great Khans to make the most effective decisions.  
In this paper I emphasized those aspects of 
information and disinformation that were controlled by 
the state. Another very interesting subject could be 
those aspects what were not under the control of the 
state. For example the religious and all the cultural 
interactions in Eurasia, initiated by the Mongols in the 
13th century and after. 
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